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COMMENT
The Problem of Ozone Depletion-Is There an
International Legal Solution?
I. Introduction
Stratospheric ozone depletion has been the subject of theory
and debate for the past decade and was recently described by an en-
vironmental lawyer with the World Resources Institute as "the most
divisive environmental issue I've ever seen."' The controversy, on a
scientific level, surrounds the accuracy and significance of studies
that indicate a global thinning of the ozone layer, the chemical shield
high in the stratosphere which protects the earth from the sun's
harmful ultraviolet rays. While scientists have worked to clarify some
of these uncertainties, environmental lawyers and policymakers on
the national and transnational levels have struggled with the legal
implications of the depletion problem. One particularly difficult
question has been raised-is there an international legal solution to
the problem of ozone depletion? This paper will explore that issue,
looking to what has been done on the international level and consid-
ering the scientific, economic, and political factors which make a sim-
ple answer impossible.
To appreciate more fully the complexity of the issue presented
by the ozone controversy, it is first necessary to review the current
status of scientific knowledge in this area. The function of the ozone
layer, evidence of its depletion and possible causes and results of
that depletion are all important foundational concerns. Another pre-
liminary matter to considering the legal implications of ozone deteri-
oration is an overview of international environmental law, focusing
on the basic philosophy that gave birth to this body of law and to the
organizations which have contributed to its growth. Once this
groundwork has been laid, the problem of ozone depletion in the
context of international environmental law can be properly analyzed
and possible solutions to that problem can be considered.
I W. Mathewson, Ozone Controversy Lifts Off in Congress, 128 Sci. NEWS 165-66 (1985).
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II. The Science of Stratospheric Ozone
A. What the Ozone Layer Does
The term "ozone" refers to unstable oxygen atoms formed
when ultraviolet radiation from the sun interacts with ordinary oxy-
gen. 2 Ozone is present throughout the earth's atmosphere, from
the ground level (troposhere) to the outer limit of the stratosphere
(approximately thirty miles above the earth's surface). 3 Although a
harmful pollutant in low-level smog, ozone in the stratosphere
shields the Earth from dangerous solar radiation. Despite this im-
portant shielding function, ozone exists in minute amounts in the
stratosphere and is constantly being produced and destroyed by a
balance of natural chemical reactions. 4 The production rate cannot
be changed by human intervention since man has no control over
either the strength of the sun's radiation or the amount of normal
oxygen in the atmosphere.5 In terms of the destruction phase, scien-
tists have estimated that seventy percent of the threat comes from a
natural catalytic cycle involving nitrogen oxides; the remaining thirty
percent has been attributed to human activities. 6
B. Evidence of Depletion
Until recent years the fear that ozone in the stratosphere was
being destroyed more rapidly than produced had been based more
on theoretical predictions than on scientific observation. Advances
in technology, however, have now enabled scientists to test the accu-
racy of these depletion theories. One such advance has been the
development and improvement of ozone measurements from satel-
lites. According to an atmospheric scientist with NASA, these satel-
lites are now providing global data that is accurate enough "for us to
see what is responsible for these long-term changes in the global dis-
tribution of ozone .... We don't know what is responsible for these
long-term changes, but we're certain that they're taking place."'7
Based on an analysis of transmissions from the Nimbus-4 and
Nimbus-7 satellites, a NASA scientist has estimated that global ozone
levels fell by approximately 0.15 percent per year from 1970 to
1981.8 From 1978 to 1984, however, the depletion appears to have
2 See A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION: PROTECTING THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES 21 (1983).
3 Brodeur, Annals of Chemist": In the Face of Doubt, 62 NEW YORKER 70 (1986).
4 See Boville, Paper 1: Environmental Aspects of Stratosphe ic Ozone Depletion, TrE OZONE
LAYER 4 (A. Biswas ed. 1975) [hereinafter THE OZONE LAYER]. Dr. Boville provides a de-
tailed analysis of the various chemical interactions within the ozone layer.
5 Id.
6 Id.; Johnston, Systemic Environmental Damage: The Challenge to International Law and
Organization, 12 SYR. J. INT'L & CoM.L. 255, 263 (1985).
7 Weisburd, Stratospheric Ozone: A New Polic
, 




been 0.5 percent per year.9 Altogether, according to NASA, this may
indicate a 2.5 percent shrinking of the ozone layer.' 0 These findings
affirm the inadequacy of prior theoretical predictions since scientists
had not anticipated a 2.5 percent decrease until the twenty-first
century. '
While global ozone depletion has been estimated at 0.5 percent
per year, the loss is more pronounced in high latitudes and polar
regions.' 2 In 1983, scientists at the Arosa, Switzerland, ozone-moni-
toring facility reported that the average level of ozone in the atmos-
phere above their stations was eight percent below the annual
average for the previous fifty years and was at that time the lowest
yearly value they had observed.13 That same year, recordings from a
weather station in the Bavarian Alps of West Germany indicated a
seven percent reduction in ozone levels-the lowest values ever re-
corded in the station's twenty year history; and Canadian researchers
reported a three percent reduction of ozone over their five station
ozone-monitoring network.' 4 "As a result of these and other mea-
surements around the world, scientists at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration calculated that during the first half of
1983 there had been a drop of between five and seven percent in
ozone concentrations over the entire Northern Hemisphere."' 5
Perhaps more than any other finding, recent studies of ozone
concentrations above Antarctica have brought the problem of ozone
depletion into the public forum. A dramatic seasonal drop in ozone
levels over Antarctica was first reported by a team of British re-
searchers in May 1985.16 These researchers had observed a steady
loss of stratospheric ozone levels over Antarctica since 1977 and
noted especially large, albeit temporary, decreases every October.17
Now known as "Antarctica's Ozone Hole," though actually only a
thinning, this phenomenon has been confirmed by data transmitted
from NASA's Nimbus-7 satellite: the reduction of ozone above the
continent in October 1983 was nearly forty percent, and had in-
creased to almost sixty percent in October 1985.18 A particularly
troubling aspect of this "hole" is that it apparently did not exist prior
to 1977-at least data collected between 1957 and 1977 does not
9 Id.
1o See Hoppe, Ozone. Industry is Getting Its Head Out of the Clouds, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 13,
1986, at 110, 114.
I' Id.
12 See Weisburd, supra note 7, at 404.
I3 See Brodeur, supra note 3, at 82.
14 Id.
'.5 Id.
16 Id. at 84.
17 Id.
18 Id. The "hole" has been estimated to be the size of the contiguous 48 states. The
Hole in the Ozone: Can It Have Been the Cans?, DIscovER, July 1986, at 8 [hereinafter The Hole
in the Ozone].
1987]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
evidence the phenomenon.' 9
While the fact of Antarctica's ozone "hole" is undisputed, scien-
tists have not reached a consensus on the cause of the seasonal thin-
ning. Susan Soloman, a chemist with the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration and leader of an eighteen member team
that went to Antarctica in August of 1986, commented after two
months of on-sight research: "At the present time we cannot say that
we have conclusively established the cause of the ozone hole."2 0 Ap-
pearing before a congressional subcommittee in March 1987,
Soloman announced that her research team had discovered unusu-
ally high levels of chlorine dioxide over Antarctica-twenty to fifty
percent higher than anticipated. 2' She attributed this abundance of
chlorine molecules to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and similar chem-
icals manufactured primarily for use as refrigerants, insulators, foam
packages, and aerosols.2 2 Despite this connection, however, Ms.
Soloman felt it would be premature to conclude on the basis of her
findings that CFCs were the cause of the ozone depletion over Ant-
arctica, citing the polar climate as a possible contributor to the
phenomenon. 2 3
C. Causes of Depletion
The chemical processes which are thought to account for the
Antarctica ozone hole are basically the same as those attributed to
the problem of stratospheric ozone deterioration globally. A leading
theory is that man-made chlorofluorocarbons breakdown in the
stratosphere when hit by sunlight, forming chlorine atoms, which,
after a series of catalytic reactions, act to destroy ozone atoms. 2 4
When the CFC-ozone depletion connection was originally hypothe-
sized in the mid-1970s, the major source of CFCs was aerosol sprays
in which these gases were used as a propellant. 25 In the autumn of
1978, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) reacted to this finding by imposing a ban
on the manufacture and use of CFCs as aerosol spray propellants. 26
Canada, Finland, Norway, and Sweden later took action as well to
reduce CFC emissions and encouraged all European countries, the
Soviet Union, and Japan to limit the nonessential uses of aerosols.2 7
These efforts, according to the Chemical Manufacturers' Association,
19 The Hole in the Ozone, supra note 18, at 10.
20 Id.
21 See Shabecoff, Chlorine Found at High Level Over Antarctica, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10,
1987, at CI, col. I [hereinafter Chlorine Found].
22 Id.
23 Id. at C l, col. 1, C7, col. 1.
24 See Mathewson, supra note 1, at 165.
25 See Brodeur, supra note 3, at 70.
26 Id.
27 Mathewson, supra note 1, at 165.
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have resulted in a decline in the worldwide production of CFCs by
twenty-one percent since 1974, but have not been as effective in
curbing worldwide aerosol and non-aerosol uses of the compounds
which increased by seven percent from 1982 to 1983.28
Because CFCs have been identified as a major contributor to the
ozone problem and because the production of these chemicals for
aerosol purposes has been somewhat reduced, much of the attention
of environmentalists, especially in this country, has focused on curb-
ing or banning the non-aerosol uses of chlorofluorocarbons. 29 The
primary non-aerosol uses are as refrigerator coolants and plastic
foams,30 e.g., fast food containers-products which are in high de-
mand, particularly in developed countries. 31 An effort was made by
the EPA to curtail these non-aerosol uses, not long after it placed the
ban on aerosol uses of CFCs in the United States.3 2 This second
phase of the EPA's response to the CFC threat was soon abandoned,
however, when it was determined that substitutes for these chemicals
in refrigeration and foam plastics would be too costly and difficult to
produce. 33 Since 1978, when "Phase Two" was rejected, the chemi-
cal industry has made little effort to find or implement alternatives to
the continued manufacturing and use of CFCs; this may be explained
by two factors: First, the compounds are "nearly ideal refrigerants
[and second, preliminary studies reaffirm that] substitutes would be
uneconomical to make, require difficult changes in manufacturing
plants, take a minimum of ten years to develop and market, and in-
volve controversial toxicity testing for adverse health effects." 34
Although industry has preferred to minimize the problem of
ozone deterioration and the role of CFCs in that destruction,3 5 the
EPA is apparently reevaluating its 1978 decision not to require cut-
28 Id.
29 See Brodeur, supra note 3, at 81. Professor F. Sherwood Rowland, a University of
California at Irvine chemist who, with a colleague, theorized a CFC-ozone connection in
1974, recommends a worldwide ban on aerosol uses and a sharp international reduction of
non-aerosol uses. Id. David D. Doninger, senior staff attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council, proposes a total ban on all CFC uses within ten years, beginning with an
80% decrease in world production in the next five years. Hoppe, supra note 10, at 110.
30 See Hoppe, supra note 10, at 110.
31 Id. This high demand is evidenced by the fact that DuPont and four other U.S.
companies sell approximately $750 million worth of CFCs annually. This accounts for one-
third of the CFCs consumed worldwide. Id.
32 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 75. The aerosol ban was announced in the spring of
1977, while the non-aerosol reduction was announced in the summer of 1978. Id.
33 Id. Substitutes for aerosol sprays are not, relatively speaking, expensive. See John-
ston, supra note 6, at 264 n.34.
34 Hoppe, supra note 10, at 114. DuPont, the world's largest producer of CFCs, con-
cluded a $15 million research program in 1980 which evaluated the suitability of substi-
tutes. Id.
35 Professor Rowland contends that the failure to deal with the chlorofluorocarbon
problem is in part due to the "obstruction and obfuscation on the part of industry." Bro-
deur, supra note 3, at 80. Some of this "obstruction and obfuscation" has resulted from the
lobbying efforts of the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy, a group of producers and
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backs on production of the chemicals. A recently released report
from the Agency recommended that the threat posed by depletion of
the ozone be treated as a priority concern. 36 Lee Thomas, Adminis-
trator of the EPA, has also lent his support to a proposed interna-
tional agreement to protect the ozone layer, noting: "It strengthens
the United States position that immediate worldwide actions are
necessary to reduce emissions into the atmosphere of chemicals sus-
pected of depleting the ozone layer. While our current understand-
ing of all the factors involved is less than complete, the potential
consequences are too great to delay action." 37
D. Results of Depletion
As EPA administrator Thomas suggests, the potential conse-
quences of continued ozone depletion are "too great to delay ac-
tion."38  Increased ultraviolet radiation, which results from a
thinning of the ozone layer, has been linked to "increased skin can-
cer, suppression of human immune responses, reduced crop yields
and climatic changes." ' 39 Alterations in the world's weather patterns
have been hypothesized as a danger of ozone destruction because it
is believed that such destruction could shift stratospheric tempera-
tures sufficient to bring about these changes. 40 Additionally, Dr.
Ralph Cicerone, Director of the Atmospheric Chemistry Division of
the National Center for Atmospheric Research, has estimated that
one-third of the greenhouse effect, a phenomenon many fear is caus-
ing a global warming, may be attributed to CFC emissions. 41 In
terms of the threat to Earth's ecosystem, the National Academy of
Science warned in 1979 that increased solar radiation "could have
intolerable consequences for the world's food supply by reducing
crop yields, killing the larvae of several important seafood species
(including shrimp and crab), and destroying microorganisms at the
base of the marine food chain."' 42 Furthermore, scientists have esti-
industrial users of CFCs which formed in the summer of 1980 to counteract attempts to
subject the chemicals to regulation. Id. at 77.
36 See Shabecoff, EPA Report Says Agency is Focusing on Wrong Problems, N.Y. Times, Feb.
19, 1987, at 1, col. I [hereinafter EPA Report].
37 Shabecoff, Worldwide Pact Sought on Ozone, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1987, at 14, col. 1
[hereinafter Worldwide Pact].
38 Id.
39 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE OZONE, S. REP. No. 13, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1986) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 13,
99th Cong., 2d Sess.].
40 See Brodeur, supra note 3, at 72-73. This is the belief of Professor F. Sherwood
Rowland and Dr. Mario J. Molina, scientists at the University of California at Irvine who
first raised the alarm about the dangers of chlorofluorocarbons more than a decade ago.
Id. at 70, 72-73.
41 See HEARINGS ON S. 503 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON Toxic SUBSTANCES AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL OVERSIGHT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1985).
42 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 76. See also THE OZONE LAYER, supra note 4, at 21-34
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mated that 150 of the 200 major crops are highly vulnerable to ultra-
violet radiation. 43
The possible direct consequences of ozone depletion on human
health are a major concern of those studying the problem. Accord-
ing to a recent study by the EPA, ozone depletion will cause forty
million additional cases of skin cancer and 800,000 more cancer fa-
talities in the next eighty-eight years. 44 Others calculate that a ten to
fifteen percent decrease in the ozone layer could mean 1.5 million
new skin cancer victims worldwide each year, by the end of the twen-
tieth century. 45 In addition to this dramatic increase in skin cancer
cases, more ultraviolet radiation would also result in painful eye irri-
tations and complications within the body's immunity system.46
Based on these findings by leaders in the physiological, ecologi-
cal, and meteorological sciences, it would seem that the time has
come to take firm and concerted action to find a solution to the
ozone problem. Because chlorofluorocarbon molecules do not re-
spect national or continental boundaries, the danger they present to
the ozone layer should be an international concern. 47 However,
while the scope of the problem is international, that is not to say that
the most viable solution is necessarily that broad. Regardless, the
viability of an international solution must be considered in the con-
text of present international environmental law.
III. International Environmental Law
A. Introduction
The concept of an international law of the environment is
largely a product of the twentieth century-its technological ad-
vances, increased scientific understanding of the ecological results of
those advances, and subsequent public concern about the future of
our planet.48 In recent years, this area of law has been developing at
("Effects of Changing Levels of Ultraviolet Radiation on Phytoplankton") and at 35-52
("Effects of Changing Levels of Ultraviolet Radiation on Plant and Timber Production").
43 Hoppe, supra note 10, at 114.
44 Worldwide Pact, supra note 37, at 14, col. 1.
45 See A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 22.
46 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 78.
47 Id. at 80. Professor Rowland has observed:
[C]hlorofluorocarbon molecules, no matter where they are released, dis-
perse very quickly throughout the atmosphere, and . . . an emission in Eu-
rope, say, will sweep across Asia and the Pacific and reach the California
coast in about a month . . . . [T]he damage now being inflicted upon the
ozone above the United States-or, for that matter, above any other nation-
is cumulative damage caused by chlorofluorocarbons that have been released
throughout the world.
Id.
48 See generally, Johnston, supra note 6, at 255. "Like it or not, we are all the children
of Hiroshima and Rachel Carson. Today, forty years after Hiroshima, we are infinitely
more sophisticated about the range of threats we pose to the planet and the harms we
actually inflict." Id.
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a rapid pace as current problems such as oil spills, acid rain, and
transboundary pollution, generally, have affirmed that "the environ-
ment knows no frontier." 4 9 There has been a growing recognition
that "pollution and other sorts of environmental harm are propo-
gated regardless of state sovereignty and its limits. [And that] [a]s a
consequence, the struggle against it must be international. ' 50 Fur-
thermore, "the quality of the environment and natural resource
management are no longer regarded as solely domestic concerns, for
environmental impacts may be much more wide-ranging: they may
dramatically affect foreign economies, or public health, and they may
even ignite belligerent actions." 5 1
Focusing on the international nature of the problems facing our
environment, legal solutions were initially conceptualized within the
rubric of traditional international law, with little emphasis being
placed on ecological concerns. 52 For example, "[i]n the earliest trea-
ties, arbitrations, and adjudications involving environment-related
disputes, established principles of international law were extended to
environment-related issues rather than legal concepts being modi-
fied or enlarged by environmental concepts."5 3
Basically, two principles of international law have been applied
to environmental issues. First, "a nation should not permit action
within its territorial jurisdiction to harm the interests of other na-
tions."'5 4 Second, "nations should cooperate to serve the mutual in-
terests of their respective peoples."' 55 Recent modifications in these
concepts include the notion that this international cooperation
49 A. Kiss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 12 (1976). See also Benedick, Environment in the Foreign Policy Agenda, DEP'T ST. BULL.
55 (June 1986) [hereinafter Foreign Policy]; W. GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRON-
MENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 217 (1976).
50 A. Kiss, supra note 49, at 12.
51 Lutz, Directions of Environmental Law in the International System: An Assessment of Tasks
and Challenges for Lawyers, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 192, 194 (1978) (citations omitted).
52 See id. at 9; L. CALDWELL, CONCEPTS IN DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICIES, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 12 (1974).
53 L. CALDWELL, supra note 52, at 12.
54 Id. This was established as a tenet of international environmental law in the Corfu
Channel Case (1949), which involved the destruction of two British military vessels in the
Corfu Channel of the Adriatic Sea by mines placed in the Channel by the Albanian govern-
ment. Id. at 13. The International Court ofJustice held that "every state has an obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states." Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
A corollary to this principle is that there should be international liability for injury to
the environment. See A. KIss, supra note 49, at 29.
[However,] injury caused to the environment is not illegal in itself in present
positive international law. [B]ut, in certain cases the environmental injury
will cause private damages and consequently, international liability for dam-
.ages caused to other States or to their nationals by environmentally harmful
activities.
Id. at 41.
55 L. CALDWELL, supra note 52, at 12-13.
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should take the form of legal efforts to preserve and protect the envi-
ronment 5 6 and that international law should recognize a human
right to a "clean, pure, healthy, and even decent environment."-5 7
While current environmental problems have necessitated the
development of new international legal theories, the problems have
also influenced the way man thinks about himself, others, and their
shared ecosystem. No longer is man viewed as a master and exploi-
ter of Earth, but as its custodian or steward. 58 Additionally, a new
sense of man's interdependence "has fostered a growing realization
in foreign ministries around the world that many international activi-
ties-trade, industrial investment, development assistance-have
profound implications for the environment. ' 59 Many nations now
recognize a shared responsibility to safeguard human health and to
"preserve the common natural heritage." 60 Three other sociological
concepts have been identified as influencing contemporary views of
international environmental law: (1) the unity of the biosphere, rec-
ognizing that Earth is a biophysical unity which can only be protected
by the common effort of all people and nations; (2) the unique na-
ture of Earth, emphasizing the rarity of "life" in the Universe; and
(3) the natural limitations of political fiat, declaring the impracticality
of absolute state sovereignty in cases of transboundary environmen-
tal injury.6 1 Together, these five concepts may be seen as the philo-
sophical underpinnings of the two basic principles of international
environmental law highlighted above.
To the extent nations believe they should not allow actions
within their boundaries to cause injury to the environment of other
nations and inasmuch as they recognize a need to cooperate to pro-
tect and preserve the biosphere, there exists a body of customary
international environmental law.62 As in international law generally,
this corpus of law is based on "the conduct of states in practical life,
and the acceptance by other states of this practice."' 63 Such custom-
ary law is binding between states "because of the fact that states hold
56 See A. Kiss, supra note 49, at 29.
57 W. GORMLEY, supra note 49, at 1.
58 See B. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 10 (1976). "[M]an's obliga-
tions as Earth's custodian have been reinforced by the demands of his fellows that they not
be required to suffer from the Earth-destroying activities of other men." L. CALDWELL,
supra note 52, at 22. Thus, the notion of a custodianship role as to the environment has
more force than a mere moral conclusion. Id.
59 Foreign Policy, supra note 49, at 55.
6(o Id. See also L. CALDWELL, supra note 52, at 20-21.
61 See L. CALDWELL, supra note 52, at 18-23.
62 See B. JOHNSON, supra note 58, at 10-11. Other labels for this field of law include
general international environmental law and international law of the environment. Id. See
A. Kiss, supra note 49, at 18. The latter would also include those treaties which have been
"universally accepted as reflecting existing international (environmental] law." Id.
63 B. JOHNSON, supra note 58, at 11.
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the opinion that a certain rule of customary law is a rule of law." 64
These laws based on custom constitute one source of international
environmental law and are often derived from another contributor,
treaty law. Other sources of this ever-developing body of law in-
clude resolutions of international organizations and recommenda-
tions and declarations promulgated by intergovernmental
organizations or by international conferences. 65 Like treaties, some
resolutions of international organizations have a legally binding ef-
fect on their signatory states. 66 This, however, is not the case with
recommendations and declarations which generally have no binding
force. 67 "They constitute what is called 'soft law,' i.e., rules which
have to be considered as law insofar as they fix norms with which
States should comply, but which cannot be enforced in the tradi-
tional meaning of the term."' 68 Together with treaties and resolu-
tions of international organizations, these recommendations and
declarations embody what has been termed "the conventional law of
the environment.
' 6 9
B. International Organizations and the Environment
A plethora of transnational organizations now exists which en-
gage in environmental protection activities. 70 In fact, one writer has
observed: "There must be few international institutions which are
not concerning themselves with environmental questions and con-
tributing to the growth of 'the conventional law of the environment'
in one form or another."'7' A survey of the activities and contribu-
tions of all of these organizations is beyond the scope of this paper,
but a brief overview of the work of four such organizations, the
Council of Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC), the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
and the United Nations (UN), provides a useful framework for con-
sidering the feasibility of an international solution to the problem of
ozone depletion. Because the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) has taken the lead in addressing the ozone prob-
lem, greater emphasis will be placed on that agency and on the work
of the UN generally.
On a regional level, the Council of Europe has long been the
political organization in the vanguard of international environ-
64 Id.
65 See A. Kiss, supra note 49, at 20-28.
66 See id. at 20.
67 See id. at 23.
68 Id. (citation omitted).
69 See Brown, The Conventional Law of the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAl. LAW 25 (1974).
70 See Kay & Jacobson, A Framework for Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 12 (1983).
71 See Brown, supra note 69, at 25.
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mentalism. 72 Though not particularly impressive in terms of the
number or significance of conventions it has sponsored, 73 the Coun-
cil has adopted a number of declarations and charters designed to
protect the environment and has illustrated "that the formulation of
general rules in a regional framework in view of the harmonization of
national legislation can be effective." '74 The Council has achieved
that harmonization largely through the efforts of various committees
and conferences which have worked to stimulate public interest in
the problem of environmental degradation. 7 5 One such conference,
the European Conservation Conference of February 1970, is particu-
larly noteworthy for its recommendation that an International Char-
ter for the Defense of Nature be compiled and for its adoption of a
Declaration on the Management of the Natural Environment of
Europe which, among other things, called for a conventional harmo-
nization of pollution standards and the preparation of a Protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), guaranteeing
the right of every individual to enjoy a healthy and unspoiled
environment. 76
As a supranational organization, the nine-member European
Economic Community has the potential to become an important
contributor to environmental protection. 7 7 However, because of a
lack of specific powers in the Treaty of Rome, which governs the
EEC, this potential has not yet been realized. 78 Furthermore, the
Treaty compels EEC nations to act in harmony with one another
which has frustrated attempts to regulate chlorofluorocarbons in
EEC nations because those opposed to such action have been able to
prevent strong controls. 7 9 A graphic illustration of the Commis-
sion's significant, but not totally successful efforts to protect the Eu-
72 See W. GORMLEY, supra note 49, at 4. The Council's activities in this area go back as
early as the 1950s. Id.
73 See Brown, supra note 69, at 27. Only two of the Council's conventions have be-
come effective-the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heri-
tage (1970) and the European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain
Detergents in Washing and Cleaning Products (1971). Id. (citations omitted).
74 A. Kiss, supra note 49, at 104.
75 See Brown, supra note 69, at 27.
76 Id. at 27-28 (citation omitted).
77 See id. at 28. The author notes three reasons for this potential:
First, in terms of integration and real powers, this supranational institution is
by far the most advanced in Europe and is in a position to mold and harmo-
nize the environmental legislation of its nine Member States. Second, as a
major trade bloc, the EEC is in a position to influence the environmentally-
relevant policies of industry in other States by requiring imports from these
States to meet stringent anti-pollution standards. Third, as a major source of
development aid, the EEC is in a position to assist developing States to meet
the costs of environmental policies which might otherwise be considered too
expensive in socio-economic terms.
Id. at 28-29.
78 Id. at 29.
7) See Stoel, Fluorocarbons: Mobilizing Concern and Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION 65 (1983).
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ropean environment is the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution.80 The Convention, held in November
1979, was called to address the problems of transboundary air pollu-
tion and culminated in the signing of the first multilateral agreement
dealing with the problems. 8' It has been asserted, however, that the
agreement was merely a symbolic victory for the environment since it
contains no numerical goals for pollution abatement, no timetable
for clean-up actions, and no abatement and enforcement
provisions.82
Like the EEC, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development is organized on a regional intergovernmental level and
has been especially active in addressing environmental issues in re-
cent years.83 "[C]onsisting of the industrialized countries of the
Western World with over two-thirds of the world's trade and a high
standard of living, [the OECD] is a unique body for dealing with the
economic implications of environmental problems as they affect a
market economy system."8 4 This potential for influencing its con-
stituent nations can be clearly seen in the OECD's Governing Coun-
cil, which has the authority to issue decisions binding all members
and can submit nonbinding recommendations to members for their
implementation. The Council's authority is limited, however, in that
it is conditioned on the unanimous vote of Council members.8 5 In
the area of chlorofluorocarbon regulation, the OECD has done little
to exercise this rather extensive authority. A comprehensive study of
the economic impact of such regulation was initiated by the organiza-
tion in 1976 and resulted in a published report in January 1978. Sig-
nificantly, this study concluded that a ban on aerosols in member
nations would have a substantial impact if a compliance deadline of
six months was set as opposed to a moderate impact if the deadline
was extended to thirty months. 86 The OECD has not taken further
action on the chlorofluorocarbon issue since this 1978 report. Some
suggest that the members of its Environment Committee have de-
cided that other organizations are adequately handling the
problem.8 7
Whether or not the United Nations is adequately handling the
problem of CFC emissions, specifically, or global environmental con-
80 See Smith, The United Nations and the Environment: Sometimes a Great Notion?, 19 TEX.
INT'L LJ. 335, 355 (1984).
81 Id. Thirty-one of the thirty-four members of the Economic Commission for Europe
signed the agreement. Id.
82 Id. at 355-56.
83 See A. Kiss, supra note 49, at 21.
84 Stein, The Potential of Regional Otganizations in Managing Man's Environment, in LAW,
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 259 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).





cerns, generally, is a subject of heated debate.88 There can be little
doubt, however, that the United Nations Environment Programme
has stimulated "environmental awareness" since its inception in
1973.89 The UN's involvement in environmental activism predates
the creation of UNEP by nearly twenty-five years: its first conference
dealing with environmental topics, the Scientific Conference on the
Conservation and Utilization of Resources, was held in 1949.90 A
more comprehensive conference was called by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in 1968.91 The
primary concern of those attending this Intergovernmental Confer-
ence of Experts of the Scientific Basis for the Rational Use and Con-
servation of the Resources of the Biosphere (the Biosphere
Conference) was to bring about "the coordination of national and
international research efforts to identify threats to the global envi-
ronment and to plan resource-management policies to be imple-
mented at all levels of government to help meet these threats. ' ' 92 At
the conclusion of the Conference, it was reported:
In the place of single-purpose actions in disregard. of their associ-
ated consequences, both public and private, there is need to substi-
tute planned programs for the management of resources if past
degradation of the environment and deterioration of the ecosystem
are to be corrected, if the biosphere's productivity is to be main-
tained and even enhanced, and if aesthetic appreciation is given op-
portunity to flower.
9 3
Unfortunately, these scientific findings were not translated into
88 See Smith, supra note 80, at 337. The author analyzes the UNEP's global protection
plan and concludes that it "would do well to cease its work and return to the member
states the inherent responsibility for determining on their own initiative both the nature of
environmental issues and the extent to which action will be taken in order to meet those
various environmental matters of concern." Id. at 337. But see Johnston, supra note 6.
This author asserts that the development of international environmental law requires,
among other things, a broad geographical diversity which would "ensure that a balance is
achieved among the predominant viewpoints and interests reflected in culture, ideology,
and economy." Id. at 279. He further concludes that "it is important that the task [of
designing a politically acceptable global conservation or emission control strategy] should
be promoted or coordinated by a global body, such as UNEP (official) or the International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) (unofficial), which is
sensitive to the cultural, ideological, and economical interests and viewpoints of different
countries, blocs, or regions in the international community." Id. (citation omitted).
89 See Smith, supra note 80, at 336. Dr. Mostafa K. Tolba, the Executive Director of
UNEP, reflecting on the UN's work on environmental issues from 1972 to 1982, stated that
the stimulation of "environmental awareness" was the Programme's most notable achieve-
ment. Id. (citation omitted).
90 See Kay & Jacobson, supra note 70, at 10. The sense of alarm and urgency prevail-
ing at UN conferences held in the 1970s to address global environmental problems was
totally absent in 1949. Id.
91 See A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 4. Sixty-two nations and a number of international
organizations were represented at the Conference, which was held in Paris. Id.
92 Id.
93 UNESCO, Final Report of the Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the
Scientific Basis for the Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere,
Paris, Sept. 4-13, 1968, at 34.
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workable environmental protection policies-little attention having
been given to the legal or institutional changes that would be
required .94
The UN's next major attempt to address the problems facing the
global environment, termed "the most significant global event in en-
vironmental history,"'95 was the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, held in Stockholm inJune 1972. Recognizing
the shortcomings of the Biosphere Conference and other interna-
tional gatherings, those initiating the Stockholm Conference empha-
sized that positive action plans were necessary if safeguarding the
global environment was to become a reality. 96 The Conference,
which attracted 1,200 delegates representing 113 nations (both de-
veloped and undeveloped) 97 and at least 400 international agen-
cies, 98 had as its theme, "Only One Earth," stressing "the fact that
all things, both living and inanimate, among which man dwells are
part of a single, interdependent system and that all man has no place
to turn if he despoils his own surroundings through thoughtless
abuse." 99 As a result of the Stockholm Conference, a 26-principle
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment was drafted, as was a 109-point Action Plan and a resolu-
tion containing recommended institutional arrangements.100
The Stockholm Declaration proclaimed a global desire to pre-
serve and improve the human environment and enunciated rules of
conduct to guide efforts toward that goal.' 0 ' Principle 21 of that
Declaration has been described as "the keystone of the Stockholm
initiative."' 0 2 This principle declares:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdic-
tion or control do not cause damages to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 103
94 See A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 4.
95 Development, The United Nations Environment Programme After a Decade: the Nairobi
Session of a Special Character, May 1981, 12 DEN.J. INT'L L. AND POL'Y 269 (1983).
96 See Smith, supra note 80, at 338.
97 Certainly, one of the Conference's greatest achievements was persuading the less-
developed nations that environmental problems were not confined to industrialized states
and convincing those countries that concern for the environment did not necessitate a
lesser commitment to development. See Kay & Jacobson, supra note 70, at 11.
98 See Development, supra note 95, at 269-70.
9) Smith, Stockholm, Summer of '72: An Affair to Remember?, 58 A.B.A.J. 1194 (1972).
Ioo See Development, supra note 95, at 270.
IM See Kay &Jacobson, supra note 70, at 11.
1(02 Smith, supra note 80, at 340.
103 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at 2, 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14,
(1972), reprinted in Smith, supra note 80, at 340.
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Analyzing the concept of responsibility as embodied in Principle 21,
the OECD Secretariat suggests that it has two constituent elements:
[1] [T~he traditional obligation of due diligence to which States have
been subject for many years under general international law, and,
[2] the determination to develop a policy for the protection of the
international environment as a moral necessity, inspired not only by
the development of international morality but also by the clearly ur-
gent nature of such joint action. 0 4
The sense of urgency in the Stockholm Declaration is also evi-
dent in the recommendations of the Conference's Action Plan.
These recommendations fall into three categories: Those concerned
with environmental assessment of "EarthWatch," those concentrat-
ing on environmental management, and those emphasizing support-
ive measures.1 0 5 The environmental assessment recommendations
provide for the establishment of a number of environmental infor-
mation systems, including the International Referral System, which
is designed to provide information on environmental issues and
problems, and the Global Environmental Monitoring System, which
monitors global environmental conditions. 0 6 Environmental man-
agement has as its goal "the development of comprehensive plan-
ning and environmental enhancement for future generations."'' 0 7
The supporting measures, which constitute the third aspect of the
Action Plan, have three components: "education, training, and pub-
lic information; organizational arrangements; and financial and other
forms of actions."' 0 8
While clearly a major step in addressing environmental issues
on an international level, the Stockholm Conference "did not live up
to its expectations."' 0 9 The possible impact of the Conference was
limited from the start, in fact, since only a declaration rather than a
binding resolution or treaty could be agreed upon." 0 Political dif-
ferences among those attending the Conference also weakened its
potential to radically affect international environmental law. In this
respect, some have suggested that "the Stockholm Conference was
'doomed' to a certain extent from the very beginning, because of the
fact that the USSR and most of the Eastern Bloc of Socialist States
boycotted the meeting, simply because of the Western Powers' re-
104 OECD Secretariat, Observations on the International Responsibility of States in Relation to
the Protection of the Environment, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 381-82
(OECD ed. 1977). The Secretariat's note thoroughly analyzes these two elements and
concludes with an examination of the possible legal implications of the concept of respon-
sibility. Id. at 380-408.
105 See Smith, supra note 80, at 338.
106 Id. at 338-39.
107 Id. at 339.
108 Id. (citation omitted).
10) W. GORMLEY, supra note 49, at 121.
1o See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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fusal to admit East Germany."' II Because of this political contro-
versy there was not universal participation in the Stockholm
proceedings and thus "a major segment of the world community
(and a significant number of U.N. Members) can claim not to be even
morally bound to adhere to the principles codified into the Stock-
holm Declaration."' 12
Despite these shortcomings, the Stockholm Conference did
draw international attention to the problems facing our global envi-
ronment and led to the establishment of an institution which has
played "a crucial role in the sharpening of global priorities for the
development of international environmental law.' 13 That institu-
tion, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), has been
assigned the general role of coordinating the environmental activi-
ties of the UN agencies as well as other international organizations,
and of stimulating national activities in this area.! 14 The UNEP func-
tions primarily as a catalyst rather than as an executory agency. 115
Structurally, the Agency consists of what were originally four sepa-
rate institutions created to effectuate the Stockholm Action Plan.
They were a Governing Council, a fifty-eight member elected body
chosen by the General Assembly to serve for three years; a secreta-
riat, now responsible for administration of the UNEP; an Environ-
mental Fund, to which governments contribute on a voluntary basis;
and an Environmental Coordination Board, consisting of members
from all relevant UN bodies.' 16
In the first decade of its existence, the UNEP sponsored count-
less projects and cooperative ventures, addressing the gamut of envi-
ronmental issues. Under the Agency's auspices, major conferences
and symposia have been held on such topics as the world climate, air
pollution and air-quality monitoring, ocean pollution, diminishing
tropical and rain forest biosystems, global conservation, and over-
population.' 17 In 1976, four years after the UNEP's inception, the
Governing Council identified the problem of ozone deterioration as
one of five areas to receive priority treatment.' 18 Since 1976, the
Agency has sponsored numerous meetings dealing specifically with
the ozone problem. 1 9 One such meeting, the Conference of Pleni-
IlI W. GORMLEY, supra note 49, at 121.
112 Id. at 121-22.
113 Johnston, supra note 6, at 257 n.8.
114 See Smith, supra note 80, at 343 (citation omitted).
115 See Development, supra note 95, at 270.
116 Id.; Smith, supra note 80, at 342. For a more detailed discussion of the functions of
these four institutions, see Hardy, The United Nations Environment Program, in INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7-77 (1974).
117 Development, supra note 95, at 277-79.
118 See Stoel, supra note 79, at 64.
119 Id. A meeting of stratospheric ozone experts was convened in Washington, D.C.,
in 1977 and a World Plan of Action was adopted, citing 21 issues for specific attention.
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potentaries on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, was held in Vi-
enna in March 1985.120 The purpose of this Conference was to
prepare a treaty which would impose upon its signatories the obliga-
tion to take "appropriate measures ... to protect human health and
the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to result
from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone
layer."' 12 1 Further discussion of the resultant Vienna Convention
and its potential as a solution to the ozone problem appears in the
next section.
In addition to sponsoring symposia and conventions addressing
specific environmental concerns, the UNEP held a special meeting in
1982 designed to assess the condition of the world environment
since 1972, to examine the successes and failures of the UNEP dur-
ing that period, and to formulate a future response. 12 2 The Nairobi
Session of a Special Character (SSC) was attended by delegates from
105 governments, more than thirty-five intergovernmental organiza-
tions and UN agencies, and by persons representing more than 100
international and other nongovernmental organizations.1 2 3 These
representatives noted the negative trend of the global environment
in the 1972 to 1982 decade, but concluded that the UNEP had been
reasonably effective in light of the tremendous limitations on it in
terms of the time and money at the Agency's disposal. 124 "While
there was considerable pressure from several developing nations to
expand the primary role of UNEP from that of catalyst to one of
active implementer and financier of country-specific projects, the
SSC did not recommend such a departure from the traditional role
of the agency." 125
The participants established a Coordinating Committee for the Ozone Layer, designed to
facilitate the exchange of research data. Id.
120 United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council at its
Thirteenth Session at 47, Doc. UNEP/GC.13/16 (1985) (hereinafter UNEP/GC.13/16).
Representatives of 43 governments (18 from developing countries) and 7 international
organizations attended. Johnston, supra note 6, at 271.
121 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 2(1) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
122 Development, supra note 95, at 272 (citation omitted). A ten-principle Declaration
embodied this formula for a future response, imploring global communities to act in a
rational manner and to take affirmative measures to change the negative trend of Earth's
environmental health:
The world community of States solemnly reaffirms its commitment to the
Stockholm Declaration and Action Plan ... [and] urges all Governments and
peoples of the world to discharge their historical responsibility, collectively
and individually, to ensure that our small planet is passed over to future
generations in a condition which guarantees a life in human dignity for all.
Nairobi Declaration, Principle 10, Report of the Governing Council at its Session of a
Special Character at 4-6, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC(SSC)/4 (1982).
123 See Development, supra note 95, at 272.
124 Id. at 279-80. See snpra note 65 for a list of several articles addressing the effective-
ness of the UNEP.
125 Id. at 280.
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Those representing developing nations at the Nairobi SSC not
only lobbied for an expanded role for the UNEP, but also ardently
supported ecological planning and protection. 126 This activism on
the part of developing nations is in striking contrast to their position
at the Stockholm Convention ten years earlier. Indian Prime Minis-
ter Indira Gandhi well expressed the view of these countries in 1972:
The rich countries look upon development as the cause of environ-
mental destruction, but to us it is one of the primary means of im-
proving the environment of living .... How can we speak to those
who live in villages and in slums about keeping oceans, rivers, and
air clean when their own lives are contaminated at the source? 12 7
By 1982, at least some developing nations recognized the insep-
arability of development and environmental protection and the ne-
cessity of some long-range restraint on exploitation of the
environment.' 28 The Indonesian Minister of Development, accord-
ingly, observed:
The feeling is strong in my country and in Asia that there must be
harmony between development and enhancement of the environ-
ment. There is no question that the political will to do this exists. I
am in Nairobi looking for the skill and technology that will enable us
to do it.
12 9
Unfortunately, the "political will" to bring about this harmony had
apparently diminished in those representing developed nations at the
SSC. Many (including the United States) who had strongly advo-
cated reform and pollution abatement at Stockholm were viewed at
Nairobi as having "reduc[ed] their commitment to [UNEP] and other
cooperative efforts to cope with the environmental problems."' 30
IV. Ozone Depletion as an International Legal Problem
A. In General
The preceding discussion has highlighted the development of
international environmental law, focusing on the role of regional and
international organizations in that evolution. This discussion is in-
126 Id. at 281.
127 Id.
128 Some developing nations recognized the need to protect the global environment
from the adverse impacts of social and economic development as early as 1975 when work
was begun on the World Charter for Nature, under the sponsorship of 34 developing
nations. See Wood, The United Nations World Charter for Nature.: The Developing ,Vations' Initia-
live to Establish Protections for the Environment, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 977, 978 (1985). The major
theme of the Charter is enunciated in its Preamble: "Lasting benefits from nature depend
upon the maintenance of essential ecological process and life support systems, and upon
the diversity of life forms, which are jeopardized through excessive exploitation and
habitat destruction by man." World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 7, 36 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (no. 51) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/51 (1982). The preamble concludes by citing the need
for efforts to protect nature at all levels-"national and international, individual and col-
lective, private and public." Id.
129 Development, supra note 95, at 281.
130 Id. at 280.
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tended not only to provide a framework for considering the legal
aspects of the ozone depletion problem, but also to convey a sense of
the limitations inherent in the international environmental law
model. Having laid this foundation, the problem of ozone depletion
can now be properly addressed as a problem for international
policymakers.
That ozone depletion is an international problem is abundantly
clear. Chlorofluorocarbon emissions in Europe can sweep across
Asia and the Pacific and begin attacking the ozone layer above the
California coast within a month.' 3' Furthermore, the damage now
being inflicted on the stratospheric ozone layer is the cumulative ef-
fect of CFC emissions throughout the world. 132 Because these emis-
sions result in damage to a res communis, "an area beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction that exists as the common property of all
states,"' 33 (e.g., the high seas, Antarctica and outer space), ozone
deterioration may be seen as a form of international pollution.
Although not ordinarily applicable to the stratosphere, since a state
has control over its superadjacent airspace the application of res com-
munis is valid "because the nature of the problem is essentially the
same. The cumulative effect of many locally generated pollutants
(i.e., the use of aerosol sprays) may ,damage shared interests in the
protection of human health, resources, and ecosystems."'' 3 4
As has been noted, ozone depletion has been recognized by a
number of prominent regional and international organizations as an
international problem. 35 The work of the UNEP has been especially
significant in this respect, with the Vienna Convention representing
the main product of that activity.' 36 A significant feature of the Vi-
enna Conference was its anticipatory approach to the problem of
ozone depletion: "[T]he mere possibility of a 'chlorine catastrophe'
was accepted as a sufficient reason to act."' 137 "This was a landmark
event: it was the first time that the international community acted in
concert on an environmental issue before there was substantial dam-
age to the environment and health-in effect, acting together in an-
ticipation of potential problems."' 38
131 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 80.
132 Id. "CFCs have a long lifetime in the atmosphere-unlike many other gases, they
are not readily broken down and removed from the atmosphere. Rather, they build up;
they accumulate." Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer, DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 63 (April 1985)
[hereinafter Protecting the Ozone].
133 A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 14.
134 Id.
135 See supra notes 79, 86, 87, 118-21, and accompanying text.
136 "Vienna Convention" refers to the treaty which was adopted and opened for signa-
ture on March 22, 1985, while "Vienna Conference" refers to the meeting which
culminated in that treaty.
137 Johnston, supra note 6, at 271.
138 Benedick, International Cooperation to Protect the Ozone Layer, DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 58
(June 1986) (address made by Richard E. Benedick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
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Although a "landmark event," the Vienna Conference did not
achieve all of its goals. A major objective of the delegates was to
reach an agreement on the provisions of a draft protocol on
chlorofluorocarbons. Two distinct control strategies were proposed:
One, sponsored by Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada,
and the United States, called for an international aerosol ban proto-
col and the other, offered by the European Economic Community,
recommended a thirty percent reduction in aerosol use and a limit
on future CFC production capacity.1 39 No consensus was reached as
to the appropriate strategy, but the delegates did agree on a resolu-
tion asking UNEP to convene a series of international workshops "to
continue work on a protocol that addresses both short and long term
strategies to control equitably global production emissions and uses
of CFCs, taking into account the particular situation of developing
countries as well as updated scientific and economic research.' 140
Furthermore, the delegates authorized UNEP to "convene a Diplo-
matic Conference, if possible in 1987, for the purpose of adopting
such a protocol."' 4 '
Despite their inability to agree on any global control measures
as to the production and use of CFCs, those attending the Vienna
Conference did meet their minimal objective by adopting the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Convention,
which consists of twenty-one articles and two annexes, "creates a
framework for international cooperation on research, monitoring,
and information exchange concerning the ozone layer."' 142 More
specifically, the Vienna Convention imposes an obligation on its sig-
natories to take "appropriate measures ... to protect human health
and the environment against adverse effects resulting or likely to re-
sult from human activities which modify or are likely to modify the
ozone layer."' 43 By "appropriate measures," the drafters suggest at
least four kinds of commitments:
(a) to cooperate 'by means of systematic observations, research
and information exchange...;'
(b) to adopt 'appropriate legislative or administrative measures
and cooperate in harmonizing appropriate policies to control, limit,
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, before the U.S. Workshop
on Protecting the Ozone Layer on March 6, 1986) [hereinafter International Cooperation].
13') Id. at 58-59. The Nordics had originally tabled a draft protocol for controlling all
CFC uses but Canada, Switzerland, and the United States did not support this proposal.
Id. at 58. The EEC had also compromised its position, having initially opposed any further
controls on CFCs. Id.
14o Final Act of the Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, Resolution on a Protocol Concerning Chlorofluorocarbons at 8, quoted in Johnston,
supra note 6, at 273.
141 Id. That meeting was planned for April 1987. See Brodeur, supra note 3, at 85.
142 International Cooperation, supra note 138, at 58.
143 Vienna Convention, supra note 121, art. 2(l), quoted in Johnston, supra note 6, at
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reduce or prevent harmful activities under their jurisdiction or con-
trol...;'
(c) to cooperate in the 'formulation of agreed [implementation]
measures, procedures and standards ... ;' and
(d) to cooperate with 'competent international bodies' for pur-
poses of implementation.
1 44
The Convention also contains a dispute resolution provision,
but the provision does not expressly obligate conflicting parties to
resort to arbitration or litigation before the International Court of
Justice where a settlement is not reached through negotiation or
mediation. 145
Forty-three governments were represented at the Vienna Con-
ference in March 1985. By June 1986, twenty-six of those countries
and the EEC had become signatories to the convention. 146 The
mere signing of the Convention, however, does not give it any legally
binding effect: only after twenty nations have ratified it will the Con-
vention become international law. 1 47 As of January 1987, six of the
signatory countries had deposited their ratifications with the UN;
Canada and the Soviet Union took that step in June 1986 and the
United States in August of that year. 148 AmbassadorJohn D. Negro-
ponte, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environ-
mental and Scientific Affairs, predicted in March 1986 that the
Convention would enter into force "perhaps within the next two
years." ' 49 If and when the requisite twenty nations do ratify the
Convention, it will still only impose an obligation to work coopera-
tively to research, monitor, and exchange information concerning
the ozone layer. As the Convention now exists, it does not provide
for controls on the manufacture or use of CFCs.
B. Complicating Factors
The failure of the Vienna Convention to reach an international
agreement calling for reduction in CFC production and use graphi-
cally illustrates a number of factors which make the ozone depletion
problem such a difficult one to solve. First, because ozone depletion
has been linked with CFC emissions, the problem involves economic
and not just environmental concerns. Eight years after the EPA im-
144 Id. art. 2(2), quoted in Johnston, supra note 6, at 273.
145 Id. art. 11(3), quoted in Johnston, supra note 6, at 273.
146 UNEP/GC.13/16, supra note 120; International Cooperation, supra note 138, at 60
(statement by AmbassadorJohn D. Negroponte, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Inter-
national Environment and Scientific Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on March 18, 1986-advocating ratification of the Convention).
147 See International Cooperation, supra note 138, at 58. "The convention would enter
into force on the ninetieth day after deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification."
See S. REP. No. 13, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., supra note 39, at 3.
148 This information was gathered from the "Current Actions" section of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin from April 1985 to January 1987.
141) International Cooperation, supra note 138, at 59.
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posed its ban on aerosol uses of CFCs, five U.S. companies were still
selling an estimated $750 million worth of CFC products annu-
ally.' 50 Clearly, CFC producers have a vested interest in keeping
their products on the market. To this end, a group of producers and
industrial users of CFCs formed the Alliance for Responsible CFC
Policy in the summer of 1980 and have ardently lobbied to prevent
regulation of the chemicals.' 5 ' From an economic standpoint, there
remain two major obstacles to such regulation: "First, adequate sub-
stitutes, which do exist for aerosol propellants, have not been devel-
oped for other [CFC] uses, which account for approximately 45
percent of total [CFC] production . . . . Second, a rapid move to
substitutes, where they do exist, entails significant economic cost to
industries presently dependent on [chlorofluorocarbons]."' 15 2 Well
aware of the burden additional CFC regulation would place on their
economies, both factions of the Vienna protocol supported controls
which basically mirrored what they already had in place.' 53
Economics is an important aspect of the ozone depletion prob-
lem not only because of the friction between environmentalists and
industrialists over the issue of controls, but also because of the con-
flicting views of developed and developing countries as to the prior-
ity to be given the problem. As indicated in the previous discussion
of the Stockholm and Nairobi Conferences, developing nations origi-
nally viewed concerns for the environment and economic develop-
ment as separate and incompatible. 15 4 By 1982, when the Nairobi
Conference convened, there was some recognition by developing na-
tions that these two concepts are inseparable. 55 Present tangible
problems, however, continue to take priority over future intangible
ones. This is especially true in developing countries where the pres-
ent tangible needs are often for basic food, shelter, and clothing. Ac-
cordingly, the Bangladesh representative attending the 1977
meeting of the UNEP Governing Council expressed concern over the
Council's preoccupation with the ozone issue. 156 A report of that
meeting noted:
Bangladesh reminded the Governing Council of the real priorities as
seen by a poor nation with repeated natural disasters such as floods
and tidal waves. To us, said the Bangladesh representative, the con-
troversy over harm caused to the ozone layer by spray products is
simply not relevant. Increasing soil productivity, coping with natu-
ral disasters and meeting basic human shelter needs are the areas in
which the country should concentrate.' 57
150 Ioppe, supra note 10, at 110.
151 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 77.
152 A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 23.
153 See International Cooperation, supra note 138, at 58.
154 See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
156 See A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 23.
157 Id. at 23-24.
454 [VOL. 12
OZONE DEPLETION
While that statement was made ten years ago, the current tangible
needs of Bangladesh and other developing countries, unfortunately,
have not drastically changed.
A second aspect of the ozone depletion problem that makes it
especially hard to confront and which has prevented broad controls
on CFCs is the scientific uncertainty pervading the issue.
Chlorofluorocarbon producers have repeatedly pointed to this un-
certainty as justification for not ceasing their manufacture of the
chemicals. Governments, too, have cited the scientific uncertainties
in atmospheric chemistry as a major reason for not taking a strong
stance in terms of controls on CFC production and use. For in-
stance, in the late 1970s, England and France "expressed considera-
ble skepticism about the extent of the hazard; they conceded that
Rowland and Molina's ozone-depletion hypothesis might be correct,
but they advocated a wait-and-see approach, claiming that there were
too many uncertainties in atmospheric chemistry to warrant regula-
tion of an important industry." 58 Even in the light of the Antarctica
findings, these two countries have retained such a posture and con-
tinue to ardently oppose any controls on CFCs that might result in
unemployment or harm their international trade position.' 59
Those advocating either strict cutbacks or total bans on CFC
production have not claimed to be absolutely certain that there will
be catastrophic damage to the ozone if such production goes un-
checked, but they have challenged the level of certainty which indus-
try has demanded. Professor Rowland derided DuPont particularly
for this reason:
Back in 1974, an official of the du Pont Company told a congres-
sional subcommittee that if credible evidence should be developed
to show that [CFCs] posed a hazard to human health du Pont would
stop manufacturing them. These days, the [CFC] industry appears
to have decided that it does not intend to consider any evidence
credible as long as there is the slightest doubt about the validity of
any part of the ozone-depletion hypothesis.16
0
If stricter regulations must be preceded by such "credible evidence,"
it is doubtful that they will be adopted for some time. As Ambassa-
dor Richard Benedick observed: "[D]ue to the nature of the science
and our capacity for stratospheric measurement, the uncertainties
are likely to remain for many years."' 16 1 Benedick has therefore con-
cluded: "We must soberly ask ourselves: what are the consequences
158 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 75.
159 See Chlorine Found, supra note 21, at C7, col. 2.
160 Brodeur, supra note 3, at 83. The veracity of Professor Rowland's claim was appar-
ently confirmed by Dr. Elwood P. Blanchard, a vice president of E.I. du Pont de Numours
and Co., during a House subcommittee meeting in March 1987. Dr. Blanchard insisted
that "no unequivocal trends of ozone depletion have yet been verified" and that "the
changes noted in Antarctica cannot be extrapolated to the rest of the world." Chlorine
Found, supra note 21, at C7, col. I (emphasis added).
1(31 Protecting the Ozone, supra note 132, at 63.
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of delay if we insist on 100% certainty and fail to take action
now?"1 62
At least one other major factor can be identified as a hindrance
to a Vienna Protocol to control CFC production and use-state sov-
ereignty. This concept is memorialized in article 2(7) of the United
Nations Charter and represents a basic tenet of international law. 163
One writer has suggested that because international law accords to
States such a high degree of control over human activity within their
boundaries, it appears to be incompatible with effective protection of
the biosphere. 64 Others contend that "national sovereignty" and
"freedom of the seas," "permit a state 'to degrade its own territory
... [and] to inflict injury on areas of the planet outside national terri-
tory virtually without limit,' subject only to fragmented and primitive
values of international responsibility."' 165 More specifically, state
sovereignty has been described as "an underlying 'roadblock' to in-
ternational cooperation, and even an anti-thesis to a law of coopera-
tion."' 166 Because international cooperation is the keystone of the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, its success
and the success of future work on the protocol depends on the ex-
tent to which individual nations forego their sovereign rights and
take concerted action to preserve and protect their common environ-
mental heritage. The six nations which have ratified the Vienna Con-
vention have at least taken a step towards that end.
V. The Search for an International Legal Solution
Based on the foregoing discussion, it should be apparent that
the problem of ozone depletion is one of the more difficult issues
facing international policymakers in the 1980s. 167 As has been
162 Id. Apparently, the data compiled by the U.S. Nimbus-7 satellite and the increased
focus on the "Antarctica Ozone Hole" has led major CFC producers to begin taking the
threat of ozone deterioration more seriously. In September 1986, the Alliance for a Re-
sponsible CFC Policy suggested that the United States set a "reasonable" limit on future
growth of global CFC production. " 'On the basis of current information, we believe that
large future increases in CFCs would be unacceptable to future generations,' declared
Richard C. Barnett, the alliance's chairman and a vice-president at York International, a
producer of air conditioners." Hoppe, supra note 10, at 110. The Alliance's notion of what
constitutes a "reasonable" limit, however, is not clear.
163 See W. GORMLEY, supra note 49, at 58.
164 See A. SPRINGER, supra note 2, at 31.
165 Id. (quoting Hargrove, Post-Stockholm: Influencing National Environmental Law and
Practice Through International Law and Policy, 9 AM. Soc. OF INT'L LAw, Proceedings 66 (1972).
166 See W. GORMLEY, supra note 49, at 58.
167 Bob Watson, an atmospheric chemist with NASA's Earth Sciences Division in
Washington, D.C., observed in 1985: "I feel sorry for policy makers because they have to
try to make international policy just as predictions about damage to the ozone layer are
changing substantially-every time there's been an assessment report, the numbers
change." Mathewson, supra note I, at 166. While advanced technology has helped stabi-
lize predictions, Watson's point-that policy makers in this area are not in an enviable
position-is still valid because of the complexities of the problem.
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noted, efforts have been made on national, regional, and interna-
tional levels to deal with a perceived basis of the problem-CFC
emissions. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a critique
of those efforts, focusing on both governmental and nongovernmen-
tal response to this significant environmental issue.
A. Governmental Responses
Governmental responses to the ozone depletion dilemma have
been initiated on basically three levels-unilateral (or national), re-
gional (or multinational), and international (or global). Each of
these approaches has its merits, and efforts on all three levels have
been successful to some extent in dealing with the ozone problem.
The current status of CFC controls, however, suggests that there is
still significant work to be done at all levels of government. More-
over, while there are strong advocates for each of these approaches,
few would contend that a complete solution lies in any single one of
them.
Individual nations, rather than transnational organizations, were
the first to recognize the CFC problem and the first to begin scien-
tific and economic assessments and eventually regulation of the
chemicals.' 68 The United States has taken the forefront in this re-
gard beginning with the imposition of a ban on the production and
shipment of CFCs for nonessential uses back in 1978, and continuing
to date with the efforts of the 99th Congress to pass legislation that
would freeze production of the chemicals at current production
levels and that would halt the importation of products containing or
made with CFCs. 169 Canada, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have
also taken unilateral action to reduce CFC emissions.' 70
As a response to international environmental concerns, unilat-
eral state action has both its advantages and disadvantages. 17 At
least five advantages can be noted:
[(1) T]he promptness with which state power and sanctions can be
effectively brought to bear against conduct or activities threatening
environmental injury[;] . . . [(2)] action by one state may furnish
precedents and experiences upon which other states can usefully
draw[;] ... [(3)] in certain circumstances [unilateral action may] have
a wide ranging and even global beneficial environmental impact, far
exceeding any immediate effect within the acting state's territory or
on its nationals[;] . . . [(4)] it may help to promote the development
of relevant international environmental agreements[;] . . . [and
168 See Stoel, supra note 79, at 65. Stoel suggests that this fact "reflects the truism that
this remains a world of sovereign nation-states." Id.
169 Worldwide Pact, supra note 37, at 14, col. 2.
170 Mathewson, supra note 1, at 165.
171 The term "unilateral state action" is referred to in a broad sense as "any action
which a state takes solely on its own, independent of any express cooperative arrange-
ments with any other state or international institution." Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State
Action in Preventing International Environmental Injuy, 14 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 53 (1981).
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(5)] unilateral state action may have a desirable impact on the evolu-
tion of progressive customary international norms concerning envi-
ronmental protection. 172
With the exception of the third advantage cited above,' 73 the action
taken by the United States on the ozone issue has evidenced these
benefits. First, the present lack of international controls on the man-
ufacture and use of CFCs confirms that had the United States waited
for an international consensus on even a limited ban, it would still be
waiting. Second, at least four nations followed the United States' ex-
ample by imposing bans on various phases of the CFC industry. 1
74
Third, U.S. leadership both in terms of CFC controls and in terms of
ozone research has no doubt played an important role in "the devel-
opment of relevant international environmental agreements," such
as the Vienna Convention, and has been instrumental in the progres-
sion towards a protocol calling for global cutbacks on CFC
production. ' 7 5
In contrast to the advantages of unilateral state action deline-
ated above, there are a number of possible disadvantages of such
action as well. These disadvantages include:
[(1) U]nilateral action ... tends to discourage the growth of interna-
tional order based upon mutual accommodation, cooperation, and
international law[;] . .. [(2) such action] may create international
tensions and conflicts[;] . . . [(3) it] may be inherently limited in its
efficiency and effectiveness[;] . . . [(4)] unilateral environmental ac-
tion may be disproportionate interference with international trade
and other transnational activities in terms of the practical needs and
goals of environmental control[;] . . . [and (5) such] action may in-
volve substantial competitive risks for acting states.1
76
To a large extent, these disadvantages are also exemplified in
the U.S. response to the ozone problem. For example, tension has
developed between the United States and those nations which have
not acted either unilaterally or internationally to control CFCs. This
tension is evidenced by the fingerpointing by members of the U.S.
Congress who have charged that the European Community, Japan,
and the Soviet Union have been "dragging their feet on an interna-
tional agreement to protect the ozone shield in order to serve their
172 Id. at 79-83. The author explains more fully why these are advantages.
173 A major disincentive to strict ozone controls is the fact that the benefits, if any, of
the 1978 cutbacks have not been scientifically proven. The difficulty, and perhaps impossi-
bility, of attaining such proof can be explained by at least two factors: (1) worldwide aero-
sol and non-aerosol uses of CFCs has increased since 1978, despite the ban, Mathewson,
supra note 1, at 165: and (2) scientists believe that chlorine may build up to a critical point
after which ozone deterioration may be rapid and precipitous and irreversible through
short-term human actions, Protecting the Ozone Layer, supra note 132, at 63.
174 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. See also Stoel, supra note 79, at 59-60.
175 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text. "The United States, both as a gov-
ernment and through the private sector, is the leading contributor to world scientific
knowledge on the ozone layer and the impacts of potential depletion." International Cooper-
ation, supra note 138, at 60.
17 Bilder, supra note 171, at 83-86.
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own narrow economic self-interest." 177 Furthermore, if U.S. unilat-
eral environmental action on the ozone issue takes the form of a ban
on all imports of products containing or made with CFCs, as has
been proposed,' 78 such action would necessarily result in interfer-
ence with international trade and other transnational activities to a
degree that arguably outweighs the practical needs and goals of CFC
control. 179 A third disadvantage of taking unilateral action on the
ozone problem would be exemplified if the above-mentioned Con-
gressional proposal were to become effective-those companies cur-
rently producing CFCs in this country might move their factories to
countries with more lenient, or nonexistent, controls. Such a pattern
could result in a substantial economic loss to the United States and
parallel gain to those countries allowing the production of
chlorofluorocarbons.
The observation that unilateral environmental action "may be
inherently limited in its efficiency and effectiveness,"' 8 0 not only
highlights a disadvantage of that approach but also indicates an ad-
vantage of regional or international responses to environmental con-
cerns. At least in terms of seeking more certainty as the science of
the stratospheric ozone layer and its implications for the quality of
life in the troposphere, the broader, cooperative efforts of nations
will undoubtedly foster a greater understanding. The drafters of the
Vienna Convention emphasized this need for cooperation, imposing
on the Convention's signatories the obligation to take "appropriate
measures .. .to protect human health and the environment against
adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities
which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer."'' In article 2,
section 2 of the Convention, these "appropriate measures" are de-
fined in terms of four kinds of cooperative commitments, including
cooperation "by means of systematic observations, research and in-
formation exchange."' 82
While cooperation is the key to the success of regional or inter-
national efforts to confront the ozone problem, it has also been its
stumbling block. As has been noted, a major tenet of international
law is state sovereignty, a concept often at odds with the notion of
international cooperation. 8 3 To the extent that concerns for na-
tional economic welfare have taken precedence over concerns for the
global environment, state sovereignty has hindered effective transna-
177 Worldwide Pact, supra note 37, at 14, col. 1.
178 Id. at 14, col. 2.
179 The "argument" is one that has been, and no doubt will continue to be, made by
those profiting from the CFC industry.
180 Bilder, supra note 171, at 84.,
181 Vienna Convention, supra note 121, art. 2(1).
182 Id. art. 2(2). For a listing of these four types of commitments, see supra note 144
and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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tional responses to the problem of ozone depletion.'1 4 Because re-
gional institutions such as the EEC and the OECD are, to some
extent, economic institutions, they have the potential to play an im-
portant role in addressing the ozone dilemma.' 8 5 By demanding
CFC controls by all of their Member States, these two bodies can
lessen the possibility of at least one disadvantage of unilateral ac-
tion-invoking "substantial competitive risks for acting states."' 86
Admittedly, such risks will still exist but to a lesser extent where
there is regional commitment to a particular action because Member
States, at least, will be on parity.
International organizations, because of their broader approach,
are in a position to more efficiently and effectively confront global
environmental problems than are regional organizations. However,
while cooperation among Member States has been a major hurdle
for regional organizations attempting to deal with the ozone prob-
lem, it has been virtually a wall at the international level. The Vienna
Convention is the most effective response to date by an international
institution, the UNEP, yet it has only been ratified by six of the requi-
site twenty nations for it to become international law. 187 If and when
the Convention does attain the force of law, however, it will do little
more than impose on its signatories the obligation to cooperate in
their research efforts, to harmonize control policies, to establish
measures, procedures and standards, and to cooperate in the imple-
mentation of such policies.' 88 Unless agreement can be reached on
an international CFC control protocol, 8 9 as was attempted at the
Vienna Conference, the Convention itself will be ineffective as a reg-
ulatory tool. 190
B. Nongovernmental Responses
While governments, acting unilaterally, regionally, and interna-
tionally, should continue to contribute to the effort to solve the
ozone problem, they cannot do it alone. As Ambassador Benedick
suggested, "[n]ew coalitions must be forged, involving citizens'
groups, academic and research institutions, legislators, multilateral
184 A possible solution to this problem is to set up a system of financial assistance to
those countries which cannot afford to burden their industries with emissions regulations.
See Lutz, supra note 51, at 198.
185 See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
186 Bilder, supra note 171, at 86.
187 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. It has taken two years for these six
nations to obtain the approval of their respective governments.
188 See Vienna Convention, supra note 121, art. 2(2).
189 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
190 Significantly, Ambassador Negroponte, in urging the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to support the Vienna Convention, observed: "It does not commit the United
States to additional regulatory undertakings .... We have determined that the convention
does not have any significant environmental impact and is, in fact, expected to be benefi-
cial to the United States." International Cooperation, supra note 138, at 59.
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organizations, and private industry."' 9 ' In some form, all of these
types of coalitions have been forged in response to the ozone deple-
tion concern. In the United States, for instance, environmental
groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and
Friends of the Earth have been particularly active in addressing the
ozone problem. A senior staff member of the NRDC, David Doniger,
recommends an eighty percent cut in worldwide production of CFCs
within five years and the complete phaseout of the chemicals in ten
years.19 2 Doniger asserts: "The environmental prospects are, with-
out any exaggeration, disastrous, and 10 years is a practical period
for industry to develop safe alternatives."' 93 Those representing
Friends of the Earth, though probably in support of government-en-
forced bans of CFC production, have taken a different approach to
the ozone dilemma. They recently announced a consumer campaign
designed to alert the public about styrofoam packaging and other
commonly used products that contain chemicals (CFCs) which harm
the ozone layer. 194
The work of Friends of the Earth and the NRDC in bringing the
problem of ozone depletion before the public is an important non-
governmental response to this issue, but clearly the greatest poten-
tial for dealing with the chlorofluorocarbon connection lies with the
CFC industry itself. As multinational corporations (MNCs), those
who manufacture these chemicals or who use them for industrial
purposes are in a position to substantially influence the world com-
munity, especially the international business world. 19 5 For instance,
if DuPont, the world's largest producer of CFCs, voluntarily began to
cut back on production of the chemicals and to put more energy into
finding viable alternatives to CFCs, such action would have a tremen-
dous impact on other chemical companies.' 9 6 In recent months,
there has apparently been some recognition by the industry that
some control measures, though short of total bans, may be needed.
In September 1986, the Alliance for a Responsible CFC Policy sug-
gested that the United States set a "reasonable" limit on the future
growth of global CFC production. 19 7
191 Foreign Policy, supra note 49, at 58.
192 See Hoppe, supra note 10, at 110.
193 Id. at 110, 114.
194 See Vorldwide Pact, supra note 37, at. 14, col. 4.
195 See Lutz, supra note 51, at 199. The author suggests that MNCs are one of two
ignored agents of change in the area of international environmental law and points out
how they can be important vehicles for solving environmental problems. Id. at 199-200.
196 DuPont did fund a research project from 1975 to 1980 which concluded that alter-
natives for non-aerosol uses of CFCs were not feasible, see Hoppe, supra note 10, at 114,
but seven years have now lapsed and new studies should be initiated.
197 Id. at 110. Whether this suggestion is based on environmental concern or an-
ticompetitive motives is not altogether clear.
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VI. Conclusion
The recent responses by governmental and nongovernmental
groups to solve the problem of ozone depletion clearly evidence the
breadth of that problem. Addressing this dilemma is a difficult task
for policymakers at all levels of government because of such compli-
cating factors as the scientific uncertainty which pervades atmos-
pheric chemistry, the economic, social and political realities of the
modern world, and the foundational tenet of international law which
recognizes the sovereign power of individual States over the peoples
and activities within their jurisdiction. Satellite transmissions indi-
cating at least 0.5 percent depletion in the ozone layer per year glob-
ally and forty to fifty percent deterioration over Antarctica every
autumn suggest that these challenges must be met and overcome.
The threat to human health and the health of all biosystems on Earth
from the resultant increase in ultraviolet radiation is too grave to
continue with a wait-and-see approach.
Because chlorofluorocarbon emissions have been linked with
some certainty to the destruction of the stratospheric ozone layer,
the logical first step in implementing a plan to protect the ozone is
by imposing restrictions on the manufacture and use of these chemi-
cals. To this end, the United States and several other countries have
placed bans on the manufacturing of CFCs for aerosol uses. Despite
these actions, CFC use is on the rise throughout the world, indicat-
ing that more drastic measures need to be taken. On a unilateral
level, the U.S. Congress is now debating over whether to pass legisla-
tion that would freeze production of the chemicals at current pro-
duction levels and that would halt the importation of products
containing or made with CFCs. This proposed legislation should be
supported even though the anticipated benefits may not be scientifi-
cally measurable or provable for some time. Regionally, there have
been few significant efforts to confront the ozone dilemma. Organi-
zations such as the EEC and OECD should not expect the UNEP to
solve the problem alone, and given their economic orientation, they
are especially well qualified to initiate controls on a transnational
level.
On an international level, the Vienna Convention marks the
most significant attempt to deal with the ozone problem. Without
the inclusion of the hotly-debated protocol calling for CFC controls,
however, the Convention will have little, if any, regulatory effect. Sin-
cere efforts must be made to agree on a meaningful protocol de-
manding significant cutbacks in CFC production and use. The
Convention, because of its emphasis on cooperative research efforts
among signatory nations, does have value within itself and should be
ratified by those nations genuinely concerned about the ozone deple-
tion problem.
[VOL. 12
1987] OZONE DEPLETION 463
In conclusion, the problem of ozone depletion is clearly one of
international dimensions and one that should be addressed on an
international level. This does not mean that unilateral and regional
attempts to confront the problem are of no use. On the contrary,
these efforts very often provide examples of the types of controls
which can be reasonably achieved. Unilateral and regional ap-
proaches, however, should not be viewed as an end in themselves,
but rather as a means to an end-international cooperation to pre-
serve and protect the ozone layer. Cooperation really is the bottom
line.
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